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A COMMENTARY ON PROFESSOR FISHER'S THESIS:
IDEOLOGY, RELIGION, PRIVATE PROPERTY, AND THE
SUPREME COURT 1987-19881
Howard 0. Hunter*
The most important lessons to be learned from Professor Fisher's pa-
per2 are that the ideologies central to American law have roots in religious
thought and that the influence of ideologies can be found throughout
American law, perhaps most especially in judicial decisions. To these les-
sons we can add a third: the ideologies embodied in judicial decisions con-
cerning private property in the period from the American Revolution to
the Civil War are still with us. Three recent decisions of the United States
Supreme Court' illustrate the continuing importance of the constitutional
and ideological protection of private property, while offering an interest-
ing interplay of the theories of "public easement" and "off-setting gains"
as defined by Professor Fisher.4 There are differences, to be sure, between
the property and takings issues considered recently by the Supreme Court
and those contemplated in the cases discussed by Fisher - the contempo-
rary cases lack the drama of slavery hovering in the background. Hardly
any property case could have been decided prior to the Civil War without
a concern for the impact of the decision on that most notorious of Ameri-
can institutions. More striking than the differences, however, are the simi-
larities in tone, argument, and' substance.
* Dean and Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law.
This is a revised version of comments that the author presented as a response to Professor
Fisher's paper at the Conference on Religious Dimensions of American Constitutionalism, Emory
University School of Law, April 7-8, 1988.
' Fisher, Ideology, Religion, and the Constitutional Protection of Private Property: 1760-1860,
39 EMORY L.J. 65 (1990).
' Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483
U.S. 825 (1987); First Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles (Luther-
glen), 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
" See Fisher, supra note 2, at 112, 115.
Published in Emory Law Journal, 1990 Winter, vol. 39, Issue 1, pp. 135-147.
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I. LUTHERGLEN AND NOLLAN: FLOODS, BEACHES, AND THE
SANCTITY OF PRIVATE PROPERTY
In First Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los
Angeles (Lutherglen), a Lutheran church in Glendale, California, owned
a 21 acre tract known as "Lutherglen" along the banks of Mill Creek in
Los Angeles County. The church had built a small chapel and other
structures on Lutherglen and used it as a recreational area for handi-
capped children. In 1977, a fire destroyed several thousand acres of forest
in the upstream watershed and, during the following winter, there was a
flash flood after a heavy rain. The flood destroyed all the buildings in
Lutherglen. Shortly thereafter, the County enacted an ordinance that pro-
hibited any construction in the Mill Creek flood plain until the watershed
had recovered enough to remove the flood danger.
The church wanted to rebuild its recreational center at Lutherglen,
and, frustrated by the ordinance, filed an inverse condemnation action.
The California courts were unsympathetic and held the ordinance to be a
regulatory taking that did not trigger the just compensation clause.' The
issue that made its way to the.United States Supreme Court was a rela-
tively minor and deceptively simple one: if a court in an inverse condem-
nation action determined that there had been a compensable temporary
taking, did the time for measuring the taking relate back to the original
legislative action? The California courts had consistently ruled in the neg-
5 For a brief description of the California litigation, see Lutherglen, 482 U.S. at 306-11.
There is a lengthy history to the development of the distinction between a "taking" for which the
government must pay and a "regulation" that is within the police power of the government to enact
without a concomitant obligation to compensate the property owner subjected to the regulation. The
United States Supreme Court, for example, has distinguished a physical invasion by the government
- a clearly compensable taking (see United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946)) - from a regula-
tory interference with the use of property which "arises from some public program adjusting the
benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good." Penn Central Transp. Co. v.
City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). See also Christy v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir.
1988), cert. denied sub nom. Christy v. Lujam, 109 S. Ct. 3176 (1989). Contemporaneously with the
California cases discussed in this Article, the Supreme Court held that a Pennsylvania law limiting
the removal of coal in certain mines to 50% of the deposits was a noncompensable, regulatory taking
enacted for the purpose of preventing dangerous and damaging subsidence. See Keystone Bituminous
Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987). In a classic statement of offsetting gains, the Court
said, "Under our system of government, one of the State's primary ways of preserving the public weal
is restricting the uses individuals can make of their property. While each of us is burdened somewhat




ative on this question; the time of the temporary taking was measured
from the date of a final judicial decision favorable to the property owner,
not from the effective date of the regulation.' However, the Supreme
Court ruled otherwise and held that a temporary taking is a taking that
requires compensation from the moment it takes effect. "'[T]emporary'
takings which... deny a landowner all use of his property, are not differ-
ent in kind from permanent takings, for which the Constitution clearly
requires compensation.""
The narrow holding of the Court was no great surprise. It clarified a
minor issue and struck a balance that was consistent with a more liberta-
rian view of property rights. More interesting was the use of language
that implied a possible reconsideration of the "regulatory taking" doctrine.
The ordinance at issue did not prohibit all uses of the land; it only pro-
hibited construction in the flood plain until the upstream forest recovered.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens argued that the Court was open-
ing the door to an inappropriate takings analysis of ordinary regulatory
schemes. His argument echoed themes of the "offsetting gains" theory by
treating regulatory limitations on the use of land as one of the costs of
living in a civilized society, a cost that would be reimbursed by general
improvements in the quality of life:
While virtually all physical invasions are deemed takings, ... a
regulatory program that adversely affects property values does not
constitute a taking unless it destroys a major portion of the prop-
erty's value . . . .This diminution of value inquiry is unique to
regulatory takings. Unlike physical invasions, which are relatively
rare and easily identifiable without making any economic analysis,
regulatory programs constantly affect property values in countless
6 The leading case was Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr.
372 (1979), affd on other grounds, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). The California rule was favorable to local
governments because they could choose to avoid or to minimize liability by repealing or amending a
regulatory statute after an adverse decision. If the taking was temporary, the local government avoided
liability altogether for the impaired use value between the time of the original action and the subse-
quent judicial decision. The Lutherglen decision did not necessarily change the impact of Agins on
what is a compensable "taking" as opposed to a noncompensable "regulatory taking." The Luther-
glen Court assumed a taking and discussed the time for measuring the compensation. See also Smith
v. City of Brenham, 865 F.2d 662 (5th Cir. 1989).
7 Lutherglen, 482 U.S. at 318. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the Court's opinion. He was




ways, and only the most extreme regulations can constitute takings.
Some dividing line must be established between everyday regulatory
inconveniences and those so severe that they constitute takings.'
Justice Stevens' concerns were validated three months later when the
Court, in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,' dealt more directly
with a regulatory takings kind of problem. The Nollans had applied for a
building permit to raze a small dwelling on a beachfront lot in Ventura,
California, and to replace it with a much larger house more in keeping
with the neighborhood. The permit was issued on the condition that the
Nollans grant a permanent access easement to the public across that por-
tion of their privately-owned beach between the mean high water mark
and high land (this amounted to a strip about 8 to 10 feet wide by 100
feet in length, the width of the Nollans' lot). The Nollans' property was
located along a crescent of beach between two public parks. The purpose
of the easement was to facilitate pedestrian access from one public park to
another. The same condition had attached to numerous prior permits, and
there was a history of public transit, easements or not. The Nollans, how-
ever, were unhappy with the condition and sued for a writ of mandamus
to strike it from the permit. The trial court granted the writ, but the
California Supreme Court reversed."0 The United States Supreme Court
agreed with the Nollans and reversed the California Supreme Court.
Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia stated:
To say that the appropriation of a public easement across a land-
owner's premises does not constitute the taking of a property interest
but rather (as Justice Brennan contends) "a mere restriction on its
use" is to use words in a manner that deprives them of all their
ordinary meaning .... We think a "permanent physical occupa-
tion" has occurred... where individuals are given a permanent and
continuous right to pass to and fro, so that the real property may
continuously be traversed, even though no particular individual is
permitted to station himself permanently upon the premises."
8 Id. at 329 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
9 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
" See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 177 Cal. App. 3d 719, 223 Cal. Rptr. 28 (1986).
" Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831-32 (citations omitted). The other members of the majority were
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Powell, and O'Connor. With regard to their previous
positions in the Lutherglen case, Justices Brennan and Marshall defected to the dissenters, while
Justice O'Connor moved to the majority.
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After assuming that a direct condemnation of an easement across the
beach would be a taking, the Court addressed the question of whether this
condition upon the permit was essentially the same. The standard regula-
tory taking rule is that a land use regulation is not a taking if it "substan-
tially advance[s] legitimate state interests" and does not deny "an owner
economically viable use of his land."12 The Court earlier had sustained a
California decision that the speech rights of a speaker outweighed the
property rights of a shopping center owner, including the right of exclu-
sion, in Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins.13 Justice Scalia distin-
guished the Pruneyard case by saying that the property owner's right to
exclude in that case had been severely attenuated by the property owner's
open invitation to the public to come onto his property. Therefore, sus-
taining the speech rights of a visitor to the shopping center had a de
minimis effect on the property owner's right of exclusion. 4
Further, Justice Scalia argued that the condition did not substantially
advance a legitimate state interest in connection with the state power be-
ing used. He contended that the permit authority was based upon a state
interest in protecting the general quality of development, including adher-
ence to building codes, the aesthetic environment, and the public's ability
to see the beach and the ocean. He conceded that the Coastal Commission
could have conditioned the permit on a viewing easement and thereby
limit the height of the structure or require provision of a viewing spot.
But he did not believe that the beach-walking easement was sufficiently
tied to the interests said to be advanced by the legislation that required a
building permit. 5
"2 Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). See also Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of
New York, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978).
13 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
14 There are obvious holes in this line of argument. The shopping center owner made the invita-
tion conditional upon, among other things, no protests, demonstrations, picketing, and other related
activities. The invitation was to visit the property, to browse, and perhaps to buy, but not to use the
property as an open political forum. Furthermore, the impact on a shopping center of a decision that
makes it essentially a public forum for all manner of speech activities could be greater economically
than a decision that the public may walk across, but not sojourn upon, an eight foot wide strip of
beach in addition to walking across - and sojourning upon during low tide - the rest of the beach
down to the low water mark.
15 There is an interesting problem of federalism lurking in this case. Land use regulation histori-
cally has been a matter left to the states and, more specifically, to the political branches of state
government. By federalizing what was essentially a matter of local land use regulation, Scalia and the
Court ignored one of the principal justifications of federalism - the opportunity for local communi-
1990]
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The dissenters argued that the Court's decision was an improper intru-
sion into the police powers of states and local communities, that it imposed
a standard of precision upon local governing authorities that was impossi-
ble for them to meet,"6 and that the impact on the Nollans was so slight
that it could not be considered a taking.1 7 Perhaps the dissenters' two
sharpest arguments were that prior custom established an expected usage
of the beach, and that the construction permit was a government privilege
of great economic value conditioned upon an easement of minor economic
consequence.'
Despite their strongly articulated differences of opinion in these two
cases, all members of the Court agreed on the basic principle that the
government's power to restrict the enjoyment of interests in private prop-
erty without compensation is strictly limited. The Court's own debate over
whether the California Coastal Commission could condition the Nollans'
permit on their dedication of a public easement or whether Los Angeles
County could prohibit construction in the Mill Creek flood plain is strik-
ingly similar to the debate Fisher describes between the Whigs and the
Jacksonian Democrats in the 1830s. 9
Inherent in this basic limiting principle are a mistrust of governmental
powers and a fundamental respect for private property. Yet all members
of the Court (as well as perhaps all but the most extreme libertarians)
agree that the government can convert private property to public use."0
The question that separates the members of the Court is to what extent
may the government tell a property owner how to use or not to use prop-
ties to experiment with different ways of regulating and organizing their lives. Scalia also failed to
consider the question of deference to the political judgment of a political body - a local commission
- that is subject to the usual political process. The disdain in the majority opinion for locally made
political decisions echoes the disdain that one can find in many of the substantive due process cases for
similar kinds of locally made political compromises.
18 For example, in his dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun stated, "The close nexus between
benefits and burdens that the Court now imposes on permit conditions creates an anomaly in the
ordinary requirement that a State's exercise of its police power need be no more than rationally
based." Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 865 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
17 See id. at 853 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
18 See id. at 856.
' See Fisher, supra note 2, at 75-78.
'0 Although seemingly obvious, it is important to note that the issue is not the power of the




erty without compensating the owner for any resulting use limitations.
This question reflects some initial ambivalence about the theoretical
source of governmental power. For example, consider the nature of the
"public easement" theory, described by Fisher as a Whig concept.21 If a
public easement exists, there must be a basis for arguing that the property
owner's right in specific property derives from a grant by the sovereign,
which retains the power to amend that granted right in some way. When
the prevailing political ideology posits a system of dominion and control
vested in a single sovereign (for example, the English Monarch), then the
concept of a grant, conditioned upon future limitations by the grantor, is
straightforward.
The American experience complicates this analysis in two ways. First,
the ideological background of American law, which contains many ele-
ments of the individualism associated with various schools of Protestant
theology, lends support to the notion that individual property owners de-
rive their rights in property from sources other than a sovereign's grace.
Second, the positive laws of the fifth amendment to the United States
Constitution, various state constitutions, and various statutes impose limi-
tations on the government's power to encumber the full enjoyment of pri-
vate interests in property.22 Thus, the ideological background and positive
law limitations are consistent, and impose severe limitations on govern-
mental power to control private property.
Nevertheless, the recognition that the government can take property,
even in the face of these ideological and legal constraints, adds credence to
the argument that something akin to the "public easement" theory contin-
ues to have vitality. A private property owner can be forced to "sell" his
property to the government if the government uses it for a public purpose.
This suggests that all property is held subject to a public use servitude.
The ideology and the law of private property are nonetheless satisfied,
both directly, by compensatory payments, and indirectly, by the general
21 See Fisher, supra note 2, at 112.
22 One might argue that limitations imposed by the positive laws are transitory because they may
be changed by legislative action. Although true of statutes, state constitutions may not be truly transi-
tory, for greater formalities are usually required for amendment. Amending the federal constitution is
even more difficult, and requires a procedure that involves significant participation by a substantial
proportion of the national population. If a constitutional provision is consistent with broadly accepted
and strongly supported ideologies, it is unlikely that a proposal to repeal that provision would be
approved.
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improvements enjoyed by all citizens as a result of the public use of the
property.
In Lutherglen, the majority forcefully stated the libertarian case for
minimal governmental power to regulate property without compensation
to the owner. The majority treated the Constitution as a bulwark against
the natural excesses of government, protecting the individual from a mis-
allocation of social costs, unfairness, ineptitude, corruption, or whatever
else may be within the government's exercise of power. Underlying this
view is a thinly veiled sense of government as inherently antagonistic, if
not downright evil, to individual liberty. "It is axiomatic," Chief Justice
Rehnquist wrote, "that the Fifth Amendment's just compensation provi-
sion is 'designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to
bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by
the public as a whole.' "23 According to Rehnquist, the Constitution pro-
vides a means to vindicate individual rights and to collect money from the
government, and is not simply a means to prevent governmental action.24
In Nollan, Justice Scalia continued this theme and dismissed the argu-
ment that the easement condition was a legitimate trade for the building
permit. Instead, he argued that the two were unrelated. If the Nollans
had met the established conditions for the construction of a building at
that location, they were entitled to a permit. Scalia concluded that the
regulation offered no offsetting gain because the Nollans could not receive
anything, namely the building permit, more than they were entitled to get.
But the argument does not end there. The Coastal Commission was en-
gaged in a systematic effort to regulate coastal land use, and the fruits of
that effort would inure to the benefit of the Nollans in the long run by
improving the value of beachfront property in general. The Nollans also
would enjoy public easements across neighboring beachfront lots, permit-
ting them to travel to and from the nearby public parks. This might not
seem to be much, and it might be argued that condemnation of land for a
road or a sidewalk is the better analogy. Nevertheless, there is a basis for
an "offsetting gains" argument in Nollan, an argument contained in one
form or another within the various dissenting opinions.
2'3 Lutherglen, 482 U.S. 304, 318-19 (1987) (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40,
49 (1960)).
24 See id. at 315.
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The dissenters' arguments in Lutherglen and Nollan borrow from the
"offsetting gains" theory and a more communitarian vision of property
ownership and use. For example, the owners of Lutherglen profited from
the prohibition of construction in the Mill Creek flood plain because that
regulation improved the chances of more rapid improvement in the water-
shed, lessened the danger of run-off, and reduced the possibility that an-
other flood would carry along large quantities of destructive debris. Did
these benefits outweigh the costs of a temporary restriction on use?25 That
is hard to say, but all flood plain landowners did share an identifiable
benefit such that an offsetting gain may have been realized.
The dissents also reflect a conflicting ideology of property ownership
and use. Justice Stevens wrote in Lutherglen that "'all property in this
country is held under the implied obligation that the owner's use of it
shall not be injurious to the community.' "26 This view is similar to the
old doctrine of tort law that a property owner is subject to suit for using
property in a way that injures or endangers others. In a variation on the
public servitude theme, Justice Brennan argued in Nollan that the private
property right asserted by the Nollans disrupted the fair and reasonable
expectations of the larger community regarding the legitimate use of
land.17 Both of these opinions reflect a view of property rights that is
closer to a -public trust than that expressed by Justice Scalia's view in
Nollan. The private property owner never has complete dominion and
control, but is always subject to the general interests and concerns of the
community in which the property is located. In this respect, the dissenting
opinions echo the opinion of the Tennessee Supreme Court in the 1845
case of Mayor & Alderman v. Maberry,28 cited and discussed by Profes-
sor Fisher. 9
25 There are difficulties inherent in the determination of the monetary equivalent of the loss
associated with a limitation on the ability to engage in charitable works.
26 482 U.S. at 325 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491-92 (1987)).
2 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 847-48 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
" 25 Tenn. (6 Hum.) 275 (1845).
2 See Fisher, supra note 2, at 117.
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II. THE THIRD DECISION: DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE DEFEATS PRIVATE
PROPERTY
The Supreme Court is rarely short of surprises. A few months after the
majority flirted with expansive libertarianism in Nollan and Lutherglen,
there was a resounding victory for communitarian virtues in yet another
case from California."0 The city of San Jose enacted a rent control ordi-
nance that basically limited annual increases to eight percent for tenants
in possession. If a landlord exceeded the eight percent ceiling on increases,
a tenant could complain to a hearing officer who had the authority to
determine whether the increase was reasonable. Reasonableness depended
on the financial status of the tenant, not on the landlord's cash flow de-
mands or on the market., Landlords challenged the ordinance on a number
of grounds, one of which was that the ordinance was a form of "taking"
that condemned one portion of the landlord's control of the fee to subsidize
rents for poor tenants. The landlords argued that this was an impermissi-
ble imposition of the cost of a wealth redistribution program upon them.
Futhermore, if there was to be such a redistribution program, San Jose
should socialize the cost by instituting taxes and grants, rather than im-
pose the cost on a single class of property owners.
In his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist sustained the
ordinance against the landlords' several constitutional challenges. The
precise holding on the takings issue was that the record failed to "present
a sufficiently concrete factual setting for the adjudication of the takings
claim."'" This left the door open for a possible subsequent attack on the
ordinance from the direction of the takings clause, but a careful perusal of
this opinion suggests that the Court is not inclined to proceed further
along the path of Nollan and Lutherglen. Indeed, the Chief Justice ex-
plicitly rejected the argument made by some amici that "rent control is
per se a taking" 2 and reaffirmed an earlier holding that "[s]tates have
broad power to regulate housing conditions in general and the landlord-
tenant relationship in particular without paying compensation for all eco-
nomic injuries that such regulation entails."33 In fact, the Chief Justice
SO See Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988).
, Id. at 10. The Court's concern with the development of the record also was apparent in the
somewhat less than enthusiastic conclusion that the landlords had standing.
" Id. at 12 n.6.
" Id. (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 440 (1982)). See
[Vol. 39
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went on to state that the protection of consumer welfare is a rational and
legitimate policy goal that can justify state regulation of prices, including
rents. 4
Justice Scalia recognized that the majority opinion, despite its careful
tone, rejected the libertarian ideology of private property and accepted the
legitimacy of an ideology that attaches public servitudes to the exercise of
property rights. It was a retreat from the course he wanted the Court to
follow in Nollan, and he answered the majority's opinion with a clarion
call for the protection of property from the state. He wrote, "the tenant
hardship provision of the Ordinance effects a taking of private property
without just compensation. ' 35 Justice Scalia argued that a regulatory tak-
ing without compensation is permissible when the property owner's actual
or potential use of the property is a social evil that the state may regu-
late. 6 For example, a setback requirement is a zoning ordinance that may
be justified because, without a setback, one property owner could block
light and air from other property owners. In other words, there must be a
cause and effect relationship. But the San Jose ordinance failed, in his
view, because it imposed on some landlords the cost of subsidizing some
poor tenants. The complaining landlords were not the cause of their te-
nants' poverty. Instead of imposing the cost of the problem of poor tenants
on some landlords, Justice Scalia argued that it was a general social prob-
lem whose cost should be socialized through a more generalized form of
wealth redistribution.3
According to Justice Scalia, the importance of the takings clause and
similar constitutional provisions in cases such as this is that it imposes a
discipline of virtue upon a government that is tempted by corruption.
Raising taxes to subsidize the rent obligations of the poor may be difficult
politically. A rent control law that imposes the cost on a few landlords
may be easier to enact and may preserve the political popularity of the
local legislators among the large majority of taxpayers who are not
landlords.
also FCC v. Florida Power Corp., 107 S. Ct. 1107 (1987).
" Pennell, 485 U.S. at 13.
" Id. at 15 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice O'Connor joined his
opinion. Justice Kennedy did not participate. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, and
Stevens joined the Chief Justice in the majority.
"8 See id. at 20.
3' See id. at 21-22.
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Once the door is opened it is not unreasonable to expect price regu-
lations requiring private businesses to give special discounts to senior
citizens (no matter how affluent), or to students, the handicapped, or
war veterans. Subsidies for these groups may well be a good idea,
but because of the operation of the Takings Clause our governmen-
tal system has required them to be applied, in general, through the
process of taxing and spending, where both economic effects and
competing priorities are more evident.
That fostering of an intelligent democratic process is one of the
happy effects of the constitutional prescription - perhaps acciden-
tal, perhaps not. Its essence, however, is simply the unfairness of
making one citizen pay, in some fashion other than taxes, to remedy
a social problem that is none of his creation."8
This is a vision of the Constitution as Virtue ever ready to protect the
individual and to correct the erring ways of government, which is seen as
a necessary but inherently evil institution. This vision, interestingly,
makes judges the guardians of Virtue and casts legislators in the roles of
corrupters who must be kept in check by the guardians. This is hardly a
prescription for judicial restraint or for deference to the legislative process.
Justice Scalia's opinion, however, is a brilliant example of the role of ide-
ologies - in this case, the ideologies of individualism and private property
- in shaping judges' views of the Constitution and of the nature of gov-
ernment itself.
CONCLUSION
These three property cases from California are far from the most im-
portant decisions of the current Supreme Court, but they do illustrate the
continuing importance in American law of the ideological debates that
took place during the formative years of the Republic. To understand
these cases, as well as many others, and be able to fairly criticize judicial
opinions, we must be aware of the ideological history that forms the back-
ground for these and similar decisions. The value of Professor Fisher's
paper to lawyers and scholars is that it helps identify the distinctions
I Id. at 23.
[Vol. 39
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among various important ideologies in American life, and the differences
in the consequences that flow from adherence to those ideologies.
